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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARY PAULEY,
Plaintiff, Appellant
vs.
CAROL ZAR.BOCK,
Detendant, Respondent

II

Case No. 192638

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, IN AND POR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE
ELDON A. ELIASON
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Delta, Utah 84624
STATEMENT OF THE NAT1_TRE OF THE CASE
This case is a personal injury action in which the
Defendant admits mis-judgment in her perception which
caused her to run into the rear of the plainiff's stopped
vehicle while plaintiff was waiting her turn to drive up
to the window of the Valley Bank and Tru"t Company,
Cottonwood Branch, on Highland Drive, in Salt Lake
City, Utah. The Court found the Defendant negligent m;
a matter of law. There was no claim of contributory
negligence, nor intervening third party. Counsel for the
Plaintiff and Defendant stipulated on the amount of doctor hills of two medical doctors and of a physical therapist and stipulated to the amount of lost wages, and stipulated to the receiving of hospital report-; in evidence.
The stipulation did not go to the matter of liability.
1
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury returned a verdict of No Cause of Action
upon which the Honorable Judge Frank Wilkins rendered judgment and subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict or in the alternative, a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an Order remanding the cause back
to the trial court with instructions to award damages
to the Appellant, or for an order granting a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts is made brief because the
Defendant was found guilty of negligence as a matter of
law in running into the rear end of Plaintiff's stopped
vehicle at the drive-in window at the Vallrey Bank and
Trust Company and no contributory negligence was
claimed by the defendant on the part of the plaintiff and
there was no claim of third party involvement, and apparently the only matter for determination is defendant·~~
liability as determined by proximate cause which the
plaintiff contends should have been determined as a matter of law by the Court and covered in the instructions
to the jury,from which the jury could have offered special and general damages.
For the purpose of showing causal connection between the a~ident, the injury and the damages, the fact;;
were that the plaintiff was sitting in her car turned sideways looking in her purse for a pen to fi]] out a depo: it
slip. Her car W3S stopped, out of g-ear and her frot on
the brake pedal. TR-10. Plaintiff testifie<l that juE't
when the woman in front pulled away from fo9 window,
0
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she, pbintiff, got a tenific joit by impact from the car
behind, hard enough to throw forward two small children who were strapped under one seat belt in the adjoining seat. The Plaintiff and the Defendant, driver of the
other car, had some Lrief conve1sation immediately. That
rubber bumper guards on back of Plaintiff's car had prevented any scratching or bending. TR 12-3. Plaintiff did
tell the defendant, however, that she was concerned about
having a phy::lical problem, because of an injury to her
ne::k she had su'=>tained the year before in a fall; that
she was afraid of injury because of the collision. TR
12-9. Plaintiff made a depo' it at the bank and started
home and began to have p?in in her neck and on reaching up on the right side of her neck discovered a swelling
or lump about the size of an egg \:.,•hich had developed
since the impact with defendant. The pain and the swelling or lump on the side of her neck developed from tl-ie
time she left the bank window at Highl;-nd Drive to 23rcl
East Street, a clistance of approximately 6 blocks, with
no intervening orcurence of any kincl. TR 12-24.
She was distressed and immediately called her doctor, Dr. Clifford Cutler, who had been her family doctor
for many years and who had her come immediately to
his office. TR 13. The accident was about 2 :30 P.M.; the
rail was at 3 o'cl0ck P.M. and the appointment was given
for 3 :30 P.M. TR 15. He examined her, gave her meclical treatment and medication for relief of pain and the
lump on her nerk, placed her in a surgical collar and
macl.e an immediate appointment for her to see a physical therapist, one David Shields, at the Cottonwcod Hrspital. TR 14-15, The patient rnw Dr. Cutler frequently
afterwards. TR 15, and went to see the therapist almoot
daily. Five day8 later, on the 11th or 12th of December,
Dr. Cut 1er put the patient in the Cottonwood Hospital for intensive therapy treatment where she was placed
in traction with 6 lb. wei~ht constantly on her neck and
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diathermy treatment with moist packs and massage being
applied by the therapist. TR 15-8 • · Mrs. Pauley, in answer to question about any limitation or of pain prior to the collision, answered as follows: "I never, before the accident at the Bank, had any limitatiom at all
with my arm or my shoulder. I had no pains in that
area at all until then. To this day, I have pain in my
arm and shoulder. It starts both down the back of my
neck, over my shoulder, down my arm here." TR 15-20.
Plaintiff did, however, te:;;tify to having sustained a fall
in December of 1966, in a parking lot, for which injury
she had treatments and therapy beginning January of
1967, through June, but had completely recovered by July
of 1967 and was doing all former activities including
bowling, fishing, hunting, water skiing, housework, with
no limitations, none of which she has been able to do
since the accident with Carol Zarbock on December 5,
1967. TR 17.
The Plaintiff's husband, John Pauley, te:.;tified to
having been married to the Plaintiff for approximately
20 years; that they have an eleven year old son at home,
and when he, the husband, returned from work on the 5th
of December, 1967, his wife was at the Cottonwood Hospital having treatments to her neck. That evening he observed the swelling on her neck or a knot about the size
of an egg. TR 101. That she was in cons,iderable pain
and that evening took pain pills and muscle relaxant under the doctor's orders. That on the day before the 5th
and prior thereto, she had been very normal, with no
pain, no discomforts, had engaged in sports, including
golfing and bo\vl\ng, fishing. He knew of no limitations
physically or any discomfort that his wife experienced
prior to Dec. 5, 1967. TR 103-104.
R. Don Vernon, a physical therapist at Cottonwood
Hospital, testifier! t~at the Plaintiff, Mrs. Pauley, was
treated at the Cottonwood Hospital by the ch:ef
4

therapist, David Shields, on Dec. Gth and nearly every
uther day for 3 weeks. That she was placed on self-administered treatment at the home in April until she wav
reierred back for treatment by Dr. La Verne Erickson,
Neuro spec,ali.:it, Sept. 11, 1968.
Dr. LaVerne Erickson, Neuro specialist and Neuro
surgeon of Salt Lake City, testified that the patient wa..,
referred to him and that he first saw her on March 22,
1968, at which time she complained of injury to her neck
which she called \vhip la::1h' and related it to an accident
of the 5th of December, 1967 while she was waiting to
go to the drive-in bank window and her veh~cle was hit
in the rear,TR 56. The Doctor testified that when he saw
her, her main symptom; were pain of the left side of
neck and of the shoulder going into the area a little below her shoulder blade and into much of the left upper
extremity at the wrist are1, and this would occur e3pecially with the use or activity of the arm. That she had
some numbness, discomfort into the third, fourth and
fifth fingers, her digits on the left hand were numb. She
had head ache which was described as on both sides of
the back of the neck and in the head itself, which would
progress to become a generalized headache if it continued.
TR 56. The doctor further testified that he conducted a
neurological examination and examination of the limbs,
joints and musulature structure for the sensation, the
feelings and the strength and the evaluation of the joints
that were involved and of the other joints, too, and
found that she had some - - I think the pos'.tive findings
really were some mild differences in the reflexes being
less active in this left upper extremity, what I label a'
tricep.:; jerk, whi•:h is striking the triceps mu~cle here,
causing motion, which compared to the other right side
was le s active. TR 58-2. Doctor Erickson further testifkd that the pat'ent, Mr;:;. Pauley, had on the first
\'isit, tenderness in the neck, pain of movement in the
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neck. She had some muscle tightness which in part is the
subjective type of evaluation, and partly watching a person when they are moving about in your office has ;,,ome
degree of objectivity, or being apart from a person's ability to control it. She had tendernern over the neck muscles and some tightness, mainly tenderness on the left
side of the neck at the base of the skull, and on examination of the feeling, some lessened sen;,ation on that first
visit a.long the fifth digit here and along this heeled part
of the hand and also along this thumb side there was some
slight difference in sensation, less active sensation to pinprick response and vibratory sensation, which is a tong
fork applied to that portion, which was somewhat less
active, as well. So those were the main things I think, on
examination at that time. TR 60-16.
In answer to quesition by Plaintiff's counsel, he said:
Question. What treatment, if any, did you prescribe,
doctor?
Ans. I suggested at that time that she be hospitalized and checked for the possibility of a disc in the neck
at this level because of the reflex difference. That led to
her first hospitalization, then, in April of 1968 she was
in for five days then and had a myelogram at the LDS
Hospital under my care, and that myelogram showed
some minor differences, really, which getting into them, I
think, it would just confuse the issue. TR 60-20.
The doctor was further asked on direct examination,
Question: "What did you find the condition of Mrs.
Pauley to be, Doctor? What were her ailments?
Ans. We thought she had some irritation of the
nerve, but her primary problem was one to be treated
conservatively with a cervical sprain as the diagnosis.
TR 62-1.
Question: How long have you continued to treat the
patient, Doctor, 8nd no you have a record of the dates in
which you have rendered treatment'!
6

Ans. : Yes. We have seen her off and on since that
time, about the tin.t of the year after that first visit
about every two to three months, generally more infrequently.
Question: Now, going back to your primary, your
first examination that you made of her when you diagno.,ed her ~onditicn a:; a cervical sprain, I am going to
ask you, Doctor, if, based upon your clinical examination
ancl based upon your subjective and your objective findings, if you have an opinion ba.:,ed upon reasonable medical certainty as to the cause of this condition?
Ans.: Yes.
Que tion: And what is that cpinion, Doctor?
Ans.: I believe that it was caused by the injury that
:.he reported on that first visit.
Que.;tion: It was associated, then, with trauma?
Ans.: Yes, trauma, in 1967. TR 63-17.
Question by Counsel: The symptoms, I under. tand,
developed on the 5th day of December, 1968, and I am
wondering if it is significant that it developed on a day
certain, rather than over a gradual period of time?
Ans.: Yes, I believe the injury was the source of
that.
Question: And what significence is there to that,
Doctor?
Ans.: I think she had enough of an injury then to
ca1;se a S"prain in the neck.
A most unfortunate circumstance relating to the
facts and issues of this case is that while Mrs. Pauley,
the Plaintiff, was receiving medical treatment from Dr.
LaVerne Erickson and physical therapy treatment.;; from
Don Vernon, that in July of 1969, while she was at the
Ccttonwood Mall parking lot, her vehicle was again run
into from the rear by one Grace Harrington, after which
1
: ccident her injuries and f"uffering were added to and/or
ag-g-ravated with this occurrence. The trial of the issues
was clouded by an Insurance Ad.itFter for Nationwide In7

surance Co., one John H. Ware, who was called to testify
by defendant. There was a deliberate attempt on the part
of the two insurance companies, the one represented by
defendant's counsel and the one representing Nationwide
Insurance Co., to discredit the plaintiff and they characterized their dialogue as attempting to impeach the credibility of the witness, Mrs. Pauley. When plaintiff's counsel registered his objection to the line of questioning as
being entirely irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial. TR
155-10. Over objections of Plaintiff's counsel, the witness
representing Nationwide Insurance Co. attempted to recite conver.sation of June 19, 1971, with Plaintiff and her
counsel relative to negotiations for settlement of the Harrington accident of July, 1969. The witness stated that
Mrs. Pauley had said to him that she had been released
by her physician as it relates to injuries received prior to
the accident of July of 1969. She said that she had phy.sical problems directly related to an accident occurring in
July of 1969 for which she was making claim against
Nationwide. TR 157-5. This testimony was given despite
the fact that Plaintiff had never indicated to him the nature of the injuries or the duration of the treatment
that were attributable to either of the accidents,
but that she and her counsel had promised to furnish him
a report of evalua,tion by the doctor determining which
injuries were due to which accident which fact he knew
to be the case. TR 159-12. At three different times the
witness was asked by defense counsel if there was more to
the conversation, TR 157-11. He had said, "the witness
had indicated to me" TR 156-27, showing that he was
making the dialogue to suit himself. Again he was asked
by counsel, "was there more to the conversation in relation to those expenses?" Ans.: "There was quite a bit of
substance to the entire conversaition and I'm rnrry, but I
can't remember ex8ct worrls or all of the conversat'on at
this late date without anything to refer to." Again
8

the question by counsel. Ques.: "Do you have any recollection now as to any amounts that were referred to in
relation to medical expenses as that related to the accident
of July 1969?" (Which questiom were irrelevant and
prejudicial.) That to the leading question, he was permitted to speculate that, "Attorney Eliason told me that
there were expen:es relating to the injury of approximately $1200, and I never seen a lis1t or itemization of
these". TR 158-3. He was again asked by defense coun: el, Ques.: "Was there anything e~se to the conversation
other than what ycu have related?" He answered "NO".
TK 158-7.

The Plaintiff was by this dialogue characterized as
a money hungry, claim seeker, in the eyes of the jury,
without any opportunity for Plaintiff's counsel to discuss
the relative details of or the procedures for filing claims
with Insurance carriers for fear tha t the same would be,
if even mentioneci, grounds for a mistrial.
1

STATEMENT AND STIPULATION OF
MEDICAL FACTS AND EXPENSE
Counsel for the Defendant stipulated with Counsel
for the Plaintiff and reported to the Court and Jury the
following:
Mr. Christian: I'll be happy to stipulate. If the proper person were called to testify they would testify that
the charges I shall indicate were chargei made for services performed for and on behalf of Mrs. Pauley and
that the charges so made were so reasonable. I do not
stipulate, however, that the services performed were necessary nor do I stipulate that we are respons ible therefor. Those charges are as follows, your Honor: See
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. "l". Dr. Clifford N. Cutler, Statement for Services, including:
1
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Dec. 5, 1967
Dec. 5, 1967

Office call and Examination
X-Ray, Cervical Spine &
Cervical Collar

Dec. 12, 1967 Office Call
Dec. 14, 1967 Hosp. Admittance &
Initial Hosp. call
Dec. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 Hospital calls
Jan. 1, 15 Office calls

$ 5.00
25.00
4.00
25.00
30.00
8.00
$97.00

For a t<Ytal services to Dr. C. N. Cutler, as per Exhibit P "l" and stipulation, the sum of $97.00
Physical Therapy treatments as per Ex. P "l", stipulated to were administered Dec. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,
12, 22, 23, 26, 27 & 30.
Jan. 1, 2, 4, 6, 9,
12, 15, 18, 24 & 27.
Charges at Cottonwood Hospital for admittance Dec.
13, 1967 were $318.95, as per stipulation and Exhibit.
Charges for admittance to L.D.S. Hospital, April 10,
1968, as per treatment by Dr. Erickson were $317.90.
Loss of earnings stipulated to was 111h days, for
$180.00.
All of which claims shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit "1"
were direct and proximate results of the injuries received by the Plaintiff on December 5, 1967.
Statement of W. R. Spence, M.D. -- that was an electro myelogram, wasn't it, Mr. Eliason? Mr. Eliason: Yes,
Mr. Chri«itian, $40.00. And physic<i l therapy, $536.00;
and medication, of what bills I have seen of $58.00. As
10

medical evidence there was admitted into evidence Exhibit p "l". Upon stipulation of counsel of both plaintiff
and defendant that Dr. C. N. Cutler rendered s.ervices
to Mary Pauley on Dec. 5, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18. 19 and 20 in
1967 and on January 8 and 15 of 1968, and it was stipulated that Dr. Cutler would testify if called that the value
of the services so rendered was reasonable.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The tr:aJ Court erred in refusing to find as a matter of law that the proximate cause of the injuries and
damages to the Plaintiff was the negligent acb of the
defendant.

II. That the Court erred in not directing a verdict
on the liability of the defend ant as requested in Plaintiff's
In~itruction No. 1.
III. That the trial Court erred in allowing the testimony of witnesi' John M. Ware, Nationwide Insurance
Company, over objections of plaintiff's counsel, which
te"timony was irrelevant, inadmissable and prejudicial.
IV. That the verdict is not supported by the evidence and was and is against all of the substantial evidence and testimnny.
V. That thP Court abused its discretion in refusing
to g-rant a new trial or judgment notwithstanding verrlict in liQ·ht of the overwhelming· evidence of the defend;i~t's liahilit:v ancl of the plaintiff's injury and damage.
11

ARGUMENT
POINT I. The Court erred in not finding as
a matter of law that the defendant's negligence
was the proximate cause of injury, making defendant liable. When the Court found that the defendant was negligent in causing the accident complained of with the
Plaintiff on Dec. 5, 1967, and when there was no finding
or even any claim of contributory negligence by the defendant and when there was no claim of any third party
involvement and especially where the evidence is uncontradicted and even stipulated with defendant, that plaintiff on the day of the accident and following, incurred
medical expenses with Dr. Clifford N. Cutler for examination and treatment of her injuries, which continued
with Dr. Cutler for several days, including hospital admittance and treatment under his direction, totaling
$97.00, and when the evidence is uncontradicted, undisputed and even stipulated that Plaintiff incurred expenses for physical therapy treatment from physical therapist
David Shields and Don Vernon, beginning Dec. 5, 1967,
the day of the accident and injury and continuing thereafter almost daily for several weeks, and when the evidence is further conclusive, uncontradicted, undisputed
and in fact, stipulated to, that plaintiff had l l 1h daf.y's of
loss of earnings because of hospitalization and inability
to work following the accident, there can be no question
of the causal connection and the liability of the defendant.
Liable has bP-en defined by the Court as follows:

"Liable is the state of being liable or oblioated in law
of justice. It is that which is under obligation to
pay, or for which one is liable." Bouev v. Central
Mutual Insurance C0. of Chicago, 196 SE 887.
In Words :=n•rl PhrasP~. Perm~npnt Erl. Vol. ?5, n()'
71, in a quobt;on from Ravwoorl v. Shreve N ..J.L. (15
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vrom) 94, 104, the following statement of the law is
made as to liability for one's Acts:
"Liability as a legal term signifies that condition of affairs which gives rise to an obligation to
do a particular thing to be enforced by action, as we
say, an Executor is liable for the debts of his Testator, or, a principal is liable for the acts of his agent."
By exactly the same reasoning a tort feasor is liable
for the con.::,equences of his tortuous act.
Liability hai' always been held to apply to responsibility for torts aR well a; for breacl1 of contract and is
used in Utah's statute of Limitation of Actions. 78-12-26,
applicable to actions on liability net bound upon instrument in writing but which liability includes respon.::,ibility for torts and is applied to all actions of law, not specifically mentioned in other portions of the titatutes.
Liability is al"o described in relation to an automobile liability polky under the terms of which the insurer
agrees to pay on behalf of the insured $5000.00 for injur·
ies to one person and $10,000.00 to two or more in any
one accident, which the insured should after date of issuance of the policy, become obligated to pay by reason
of liability imposed on him by law as a re:ult of the ownership or use of the automobile described in the policy
and under contract the company becsme liab!e for the liability of the tort feasor upon the occurrence of the injury.
Such a case was Hicken v. Allstate, 147 SW 2d 182.
Liability attaches when there is proximate cau.se or
legal cause or cause not remote to be speculative, connecting the wrongful act to the injuries and damage involved.
Proximate ~ause is de"lcribed in American Jurisprudence 2d Vol. 58, Sec. 128, pg. 478.
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"As the proximate, not the remote t'.au;:;e, the conllel'
tion between the negligence and the rnj ury mu::it Le
a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken.
The law does not require that negligence of the defendant must be the sole cause of the injury in order
to entitle to damages. All that is required is
that the negligence in quest1on. shall be a proximate
cause of the injury."
Under the lmv of pr0bable cause as recited m Am.
Jur. 2d Ed. Vol. 57, Se:. 141, it is stated:
"It is sufficient if the proof show.; that various
possible causes shown by the evidence, the one for
which the defendant was re3ponsible, was the most
probable." Quoting further from Am Jr 2d, Vol. 57,
Sec. 142, "The test for cause in fact is (1) in all
cases where proximate cause is an issu~, the first
step is to determine whether the defendant's conduct
in point of fact was a factor in causing the plaintiff's
damage." In other words, except where there are
concurrent causes for the injuries sustained, an
actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor
in bringing about harm to another if the harm would
have been sustained even if the actor had not been
negligent. If the inquiry as to cause in fact shows
that the defendant's conduct in point of fact wanot a factor in causing the plaintiff's damage, the
matter ends there, but if it shows that his conduct
was a factor in ca1rning such damage, then the fur·
ther question is whether Ms conduct played si1ch a
part in causing the domaqe as makes him the author
of such damage and l:'able thrrefore in the eyes of the
law. An inquiry into Cause in Fact requires an<wers
to several questions in determining whether there was
cause in fact. Courts generallv apply one or more
of the varioirn tests and criteria. Semo c~s~.;; htiV"
relied on the ordinary natural conse0uence test or on
the substantial factor tP,')t cmflle.. orbit of the risk
test, all of whicli in pffrct ~lc1 the clefenrl~nt ]ial)le
for any an<l ~lll of the direct cn"'.'s2'")'Jences of ri,·s rurluct."
14

The circumstances surrounding the negligence, the
injury and the damages m the Pauley vs. Zarbock case,
are so definite, so immediate, so continuous that there can
be no doubt whatsoever that the conduct of the defendant
was a factor (and the only factor) causing such injury
and the resulting damage3, and according to the authorities makes the defendant the author of such damages as
a matter of law, and li&ble therefore in the eyes of the
law. Damages are automatic where there is probable
cause and liability.
ln regard to the matter of damage3 resulting from
liability, substantive and the case law provides that whenever there is an invasion of one'.:; rights, the law infers
some damage and the innocent person therefore has a
remedy, irrespective of the amount or the actuality of the
damages. 22 Am J ur 2d page 15. It is the general rule
that where a canse of action is established, the law imports damages from the invasion of one's legal rights.
22 Am J ur 2d. page 15.
The matter of liability and of proximate cause either
became a matter of law to be determined by the Court; or C1
more complete and understandable instruction on probable cause and liability was required of the Court, as requested,~ it declined to instruct as requested on a directed v1>rrlict after having found negligence as a matter
of Ji:r;.,;,,, ieaving the jury entirely up in the air with the
Court's instruction No. 14, which was as follows: "I have
determined as a matter of law that the defendant was
negligent in making contact with the plaintiff's vehicle on
Dec. 5, 1967. Therefore, the only issues for you to determine in this matter are:
A. Whether the injuries and damages, of which
Plaintiff complains were proximately caused by the Defendant's negligence and, if so,
15

B. What amount of money, if any, should be awarded to Plaintiff. The Plaintiff in order to prevail must
prove both A and B above by a preponderance of the evidence.
POINT II. The Court erred in not directing a
verdict for Plaintiff as a matter of law.
Without instructions the jury lacked understanding
as to legal cause and proximate cause. Court's Instructions No. 13 and 14 were completely inadequate. The Utah
cases have imposed upon the Court the duty and responsibility of directing and determining liability as a matter
of law when there is no substantial dispute in the evidence. One such case is Roylance v. Davis, 18 Utah 2d.
395, 424 Pac. 2d. 142, where the Court held:
"When there is no substantial dispute in the evidence
and when the trial Court can say as a matter of Iaw
that reasonable men could find ~mly one way on the
facts, then it is the trial Judge's duty to determine
the applicable law and direct the jury to return a verdict under the law and the facts presented."
The Court held the jurors are more likely to try to
do fireside justice than are Judges who have the duty to
enforce the law as it is written. Under the law a directed verdict is required under circumstances of the Pauley case.
Corpus Juris Secundum 58. In discussing trial
procedure on pags 420, is quoted as follows:
"Where the evidence iq conclusive a fact issue
can be decided only as a matter of law. Evidence
may be so conclusive as to entitle the Plaintiff to
a favorable findin.2' as a matter of law, but in the ab-
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-sence of an aumfasion by the oppo::iite party the person having the burden of proof seldom establishes
his claim as a matter of law, and defendant on whom
rests the burden of an affirmative defense may make
out h;s case with a measure of certainty that entitles
him to a ruling of the Court against the Plaintiff
taking the ca::ie from the jury." Where all the evidence, fairly cons,£dered, points to one conclusion
only, a question of law is presented which is not for
the jury."
It is viclative cf the legal righh of t:1e Piaint'ff if

the Court dCE:s n0t make rnch finding as a. matter of law,
as is stated in O'Connor v. Boulder Cclorado Sanitar:um
Association, 112 Pac. 2::l 633, in which case the plaintiff
filed action to rercver dam ·1 gee; resulting from allegEd
negligent care in treatment by agents of the Boulder, Colcrado Sanitarium As.sociation. A motion was interpcsed by counsel for the Sanitar'.um for a directed verdict
concerning which the trhl Court reserved it<> ruling. During the time the jury was deliberating upon its verdict
the Trial Judge read a part of the testimony which had
been transcribed and had the Court Reporter read to him
a part of the other testimony and when the verdicts herein were returned he advised the jury t1at there was ''O
evidence to warrant a verdict against the Sanitarium.
However, regardless of this statement, and independent
thereof, we entertain the same opinion. It is true t'rnt
Court<> should be very reluctant to take the issue olf proximate cause from a jury, and this perhaps was the reason
why the Trial Court in the instant case, not having in
mind all the evidPnce, rnbmitted the fact to the jury.
Where, however, the record is devoid of evidence showing
a p"oba bilitv of proximate cause, the question becomes
one of law for tlie Court. In our opinien, the situation
h$re calh for the applic::ition of that rule. I/
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The most convincing and most recent case involving
such requirements for a directed verdict and one which
is almost identical in all fact situations as well as being
directly in line with the legal pronouncements is the case
of Lee F. Lechner v. Sarah Bruce Kelly, 467 SW 2d 652.
In that case the Appellee te,,tified that she was stopped
at a traffic signal, did not see the Appellant's automobile
prior to tne collision. She further testified that as a rebult of the impact from behind her car came to rest at a
point approximately 24 steps from the point of impact.
She offered evidence showing that damage to her automobile amounted to the sum of $149.00. One Alfred Brinkley, Jr., called as a witness by the Appellant, testified that
he observed the accident from his place of employment at
a service fOfation located across the street. He testified
that immediately before the impact the Lechner automobile came to a complete stop and then rolled forward into
the appellant's automobile and bumped it. The Appellant
argued that the testimony of Brinkley showing that appellant stopped before colliding with appellee, together with
his own testimony that he saw the appellee and made "at
least some application of his brakes" was sufficient to
create a disputed fact issue. In determining whether the
foregoing evidence is sufficient to support a judgment non
obstante verdicto, we are required to consider all of the
evidence in the record in a light most favorable to the
findings of the jury and disregard all evidence to the contrary. If there is any evidence of probative force to support the Jury's findings exonerating the appellant, the
judgment non obstante verdicto cannot be sustained. That
the Court held :
"In rare cases, to which we think this one belongc;,
where the evidence is without material dispute and
where only one reasonable inference may be drawn
therefrom, the question of negligence becomec; one
of law. The rule simply means that if reasonable
18

minds can differ as to the inferences and conclusions
to be drawn from the undisputed evidence then the
case is one for the jury. If reasonable minds cannot
differ, then an issue of law is presented. It cannot
be gainsaid that one who fails to stop his automobile
in response to a traffic signal, _but propels the same
into the rear end of an automobile which has stopped
in obedience to the signal, is guilty of negligence,
PROXIMATELY CAUSING The INJURY Or DAMAGE UNLESS SUCH CONDUCT IS EX.CUSED
BY SOME EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OR
CONDITION.
And in that case as in the pre ent Pauley v. Zarbock
case, there L no c~ntention that there are any extenuating circumstances excusing the driver from colliding with
the rear of the &topped vehicle. For a very similar ca~e
involving the same rule requir ·ng a directed verdict the
Court cites Hoey v. Solt, 236 SW 2:1 244. Both cases are
ll'idely annotated. It is rnbmitted that there is no difference whatsoever whether as to fact situation or law inrolved with these landmark cases and in the in:::tant case
uf Pauley v. Zarbock.
To reannalyze and parallel said facts, Plaintiff Paulev was stopped waiting her turn to pull up to the drive-in
window at the Valley Bank and Tru'.7t Co.. Defendant
admits running i11to rear of plaintiff's vehicle because rf
misjudgment.
Defendant does not claim any negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Defendant does nrt
claim any intervening act of a third party. Plaintiff te-tified of immediate injuries, a swelling or lump on her
neck within 10 minutes to one-half hour from the time of
accident; of pain. discomfort and limitation of bodily functions. She testified to having been free of such conditions prior to the accident. She testified that Dr. Clifford
N. Cutler examined her approximRtely one-half hour after <iccic!ent, put her in a .'-'urgical cnllar and referred her
to a ph.v;;ical thPrapist, TR 14. Dr. Cutler treated her
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for several days and directed her admittance to Cottonwood Hospital for specialized therapy for 5 days. TR 15.
Therapists David Shields and Don Vernon both treated the
Plaintiff for cervical sprain for several weeks following
the accident. TR III.
Plaintiff's husband, John Pauley, testified that plaintiff was free of disability, pain and had no injuries or
swelling on the neck prior to the accident on the 5th of
December, 1967. That on the evening of the 5th of December he observed the knot on her neck, that she was in
pain, had limitations of motion and was taking pain pills
and muscle relaxants. TR 101.
Dr. LaVerne Erickson, Neuro specialist, testified that
he treaited her beginning March 22, 1968 for cervical
sprain resulting from a whiplash of Dec. 5, 1967, TR 56.
That she had tenderness in her neck, pain of movement in
the neck, muscle tightness, and had head aches, and he requested further hospitalization for possible disc injury,
TR 60. After treating the patient for more than one year,
the Doctor gave it as his opinion that the injury of the
Plaintiff was caused by the accident she reported of December 5, 1967. TR 63. Being specific, he answered:
Question: Do you have an opinion based on reasonably medical certainty as to the cause of her ailment?
Ans.: "Yes, 1 believe the injury was the source of
that. I think she had enough of an injury then to cause
a sprain in the neck." This testimony is not only the
greater weight of the believable testimony but the only
testimony respecting such matters and the fact that
she was injured remains uncontradicted, especially where
the Defendant has stipulated as to reasonableness of medical and hospital bills and as to the reasonableness of loss
of earnings while the Plaintiff was thus being treated,
even though he didn't admit being the cause of all of them.
20

POINT Ill. The Court erreJ in allowing the witness, John SvI. Ware, Claim;:; Adjuster for Nationwide Insurance Company, to testify relative to negotiations on a
sulJsequent accident.

I

I

)

I
•
l

r
I

While the Plaintiff wa3 recovering under Doctor's
treatment from the injuries of her accident with Defendant, on December 5, 1967, she was a victim of a second
rear end accident. which happened in July of 1969, which
aLlded to or aggravated the prev :ous accident's resulting
injurie~. Dr. LaVerne Erick.:on, Neuro specialist, continued his treatment of the plaintiff through the fir"t injury
and with the physical therapists, continued with their patient following the second accident. The Pl1intiff and her
attorney had been negotiating with Defendant's In. urance
Company prior to the 0econd accident and were, of course,
immediately contflcted by insurance carrier for the driver
in the second 2cciuent. The Dcctor knew of the condition
of the Plaintiff hefore the second accident, knew of her
symptom'3, diagnC1sis and treatment of the second accident
and should have been the one to testify, and was called by
Plaintiff to describe the effects of the second accident,
but the i~sues were clouded when counsel for the DefendPnt called the Insurance Adjuster to testify relative to
the settlement negotiations on the second accident. Plaintiff's counsel objected to the entire line of questioning;
stating that it was entirely irrelevant, immaterial and foreign to the issues of the case and even prejudicial. TR 155.
After the objections, the Court called both counsel to
the table for discussion and overruled Plaintiff's objection.
The witness after four leading questions, to which he gave
uncertain answers, was permitted to testify to the following que:;.tion:
Question: Do you have any recollection
now as to any amounts that were referred to in relation
to medical expenses as that related to the accident of July
1969'! TR 157.
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Ans.: I have never seen an itemization of expenses
so I don't have exact amounts. At that time Attorney
Eliason told me that there were expenses relating to thi8
injury of approximately $1200. I never seen a list or
itemization of these, no.
When counsel for defendant was cross-examining
Mary Pauley relative to the negotiations of herself and
her Attorney with John M. Ware, whom she didn't even
recall, counsel asked her: "And do you deny telling him
that you had incurred medical specials in the sum of
$1200.00 solely from the accident that you were involved
in in July of 1969? Do you deny telling him that? TR 51.
Ans.: I don't remember the conversation.
Question: Do you remember telling him you thought
the injuries you had sustained in the accident of July,
1969, were worth $7500.00? Do you remember telling him
that?
Ans.: I asked to settle for that, yes.
Question: And prior to that time you had told him
and indicated that the injuries you had sustained were
worth $10,000.00. Isn't that true? TR 51-52.
Ans.: No, because I didn't see him only one day.
Question: Did you ever give your Attorney authority
to settle that for $10,000.00 prior to that time? I am
talking about just the accident of July, 1969.
Ans.: I don't know what my Attorney might have
said to him when I was not there.
Question: I am asking you whether or not you instructed or gave your Attorney authority to submit
that figure to Mr. Ware.
It is submitted to the Court that the only purpose
whatsoever for the questions and answer;.; of John M.
Ware, Insurance Adju~ter for Nationwide Insurance Company, and the further que"'tions which co um el thrust upon
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the witness relative to negotiations for settlement with
Nationwide of injurie.:; in a sub.:;equent accident, was to
embarrass the Plaintiff with the Jury and make it appear
that she was requesting exce~sive amounts for the injuries she had wstained and even made it appear to the Jury
that it wa3 improper to negotiate such settlement on a
figure more than what may have been actual special damages. She was made to appear money hungry and claim
c0n:;cious. Insurance ~-ettlement question would have been
prejudicial if asked by Plaintiff. The Doctor alone could
te,,tify as to which injuries were attributable to which
accident.
It is submitted that the testimony was wholly immaterial, irrelevent and prejudicial. That it prejudiced the
Jury to the point that she could not thereafter have a fair
determinat:on of her injuries in the December 5, 1967 accident, and when the Court overruled Plaintiff's counsel's
objections to the line of questioning and to any further
quectioning which was overruled on the grounds that the
defendant was testing the credibility of the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was never thereafter able to overcome the effects of such prejudicial treatment.
POINT IV.: The Court should prevent manife-:-t injustice as is macle evident from the judgment being
against the weight of the evidence, and rehear issue of
damages.
It is within the power of

the triai and appellate
Court and their bounden duty to prevent injustice if it can
be determined to exist, as when the verdict is against the
greater weight of the competent evidence presented and
in order to prevent such an injustice, courts sometimes
0irert that partfrular issues be retried or in the alternative that cert:=iin awards be modified to prevent such ininst;ce. It goes without rnying that had the jury in the
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instant ca::ie made an award of $100,000.00 to the Plaintiff based upon the evidence which was submitted the
trial court and the appellate court should be compelled
to recognize the excessivene,;,s of the damage found by the
jury and unless such injustice was otherwise corrected it
would be incumbent to order either a new trial upon the
issue of damages only or as has been stated by this Court:
in Langton vs. International Transport Inc. 26 Utah 2nd
452, 491 Pac. 2d 1211
It is equally well recognized that the trial court or
the appellate court may, because of the inadequacy of the
award, require a review or new trial of the issue in ques~
ti on (damage) or a new trial on all the issues. 58 Am
Jur 2d pg. 211, Sec. 27. In a proper case the Court may
order a retrial on the issue of proximate cause. Burke v.
Hodge 97 NE 920 34 ALR 2d 988.
"No distinction is to be drawn between the granting
of a new trial because of excessive damages and the
ordering of a retrial by reason of the fact that damages awarded by the verdict were inadequate. 58 Am
Jur., 2d. 360 Sec. 153.
"As has been said, a verdict for a grossly inadequate
amount stands upon no higher ground in legal principles or in rules of law than a verdict for an excessive or extravagal}.t amount, and no reason can be
given why a new trial may not be granted upon one
ground as well as upon the other, although it 'is doubtless true that the granting of a new trial upon the
grounds of inadequacy of damages occurs less frequently than the granting of new trials upon the
grounds of excessive damages, because it is not as
easy to detect inadequacy as it is to detect excessiveness
"
It i!'; submitted thqt after the Tr;al Court found neg-ligence as a mattPr of law. without any evidence whatsoever of contributor:v negli<rence, intervention of Third
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Party and uncontradicted, conclusive, believeable, corroborated evidence that Plaintiff incurred doctor bills the
same day for treatment for neck injury by Dr. Clifford
N. Cutler, in the amount of $97.00 TR 15; bill from
physical therapists who treated the patient beginning
with treatments the day following the accident; uncontradicted and stipulated evidence that the plaintiff sustained los ~ of earnings because of inability to attend work
for 11 % days, in the ioUm of $180.00; and the fact that the
pla.ntiff su.>taincd hospital and doctor bills at Cottonwood Ho:pital, Latter Day Saints Ho,:,pital and with Dr.
LaVerne Erickson, Neuro surgeon, the amount of which
services ·were filed as Exh:bit "P l" and stipulated to by
counsel. That the jury were required to find some damages based upon the conclm,iveness of the evidence; and
that to find no rl.amage is tantamount to finding an inadequacy of damages in view of the finding of negligence,
and that is;ue should be retried.
i ne matter of the Plaintiff's right to a new trial is
discu:.sed in the next and final point of Plaintiff's brief,
but the serioU3 injustice wrought on the Plaintiff by the
failure of the Court and Jury to communicate properly is
g-rounds for the Appellant Court to correct the injustice
by retrial of the issue involved.
Where there has been an inadequate award of damage3 which appears to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice or under license of misadventure or mistake, under the rule a new trial must be granted to correct the error. Rule 59 A-5 Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Langton v. International Transport Inc. supra.

YV u\/ 1

v : The Court erred and abused its discretion in denial of Plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
There is nothing more definite in the law nor more
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clearly pronounced in the Utah statutes than the rights of
a party, where injustice has resulted, to relief by a new
trial. It is an abuse of discretion to deny it where the
constitutional rights of a litigant have been denied in one
or more of the following circumstances :
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the Court, Jury
or adverse party or any order of the Court or abuse
of discretion by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial.
2. Error in law or failure of the Jury to apply the
law to the fact situation against the law.
3. Excessive or inadequate damages mistakenly
granted or under the influence of passion or prejudice.
Rule 59-A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
As was observed by Lord Mansfield in Bright vs. Eyrion, 1 Burrows 390.
"The effect of a new trial is no more than having
a cause more deliberately considered by another jury
when there is reasonable doubt or perhaps certainty
that justice has not been done."
In a recent Utah case in an action by patient against
the hospial in which the jury found no cause of action and
judge entered judgement for the patient against the hospital on question of negligence and ordered a new trial limjudgement entered accordingly, and thereafter the trial
ited to damages. The writer of the prevailing opinion
stated in Highland v. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134,
427 P2, 736:

"Not withstanding- the fact that it w::i s not entirely without reason for the trial Court to cletermine
that evidence E;howed so persuasively that the Orderly was responsible for what happened that a finding
exculp<iting- the Hospital of nevli.2"ence workerl a ~eri
ous injustice anrl the o-ranting of a new trial E"houlrl
be 011 all of the issue"."
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In that case, the Plaintiff was requesting a
new trial on the issue of damage.:; only and the Court's
ruling speaks loudly in favor of the Plaintiff's position
in the instant ca;:,e. In the Highland case the Plaintiff
sued for injuries suffered while being catharized by an
orderly in the Defendant St. Mark's Hospital. Without
detailing the fact situation, the Plaintiff in that ca;:,e was
reccvering from a heart attack. In that case there was
some evidence that the orderly, Manzanare's procedures
in performing th€ function produced. the injury of which
the plaintiff complained ancl there was '-'ome further evidence that there may have been ir.terference by the Plaintiff which affected the outccme of the catharization, but
even so, the Court made this important :ctatement in
its ruling:
"Notwithstanding the fact that the trial Court's
ruling does not impres; us as wholly unreasonable, out
of a desire that a new trial be fair to both sides, we
believe that justice would best be E:erved by removing
any restriction upon, and accordingly through a new
trial on all of the issues."
The ;::;upreme Court has further said in that case,
"We have indeed frequently affirmed the importance
of trial by jury, however, it must be realized that
even a jury is not so sacrosanct as to be beyond the
possibility of error. Like other aspects of authority
in our system of government under law, it is e'sential
that there be some check against arbitrarines3, abu'e
or mistake. The safeguard against this is the authority of the trial judge who has supervisory control
over the proceedings and is charged with the ult;mate responsibility of seeing that justice is done. To
accomplish that purpo"e it is essential that his power
to grant or deny motions for new trial be recognized.
This is necpssarily rnmethinir more than simply to
rule as a matter of law that the ~vidence will or will
not supoort ~ verdict. The fatter woul<l only allow
him to judge whether tl1e verdict should be rnstained
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as a matter of law, and would not permit any latitude of discretion."
"Consistent with the purpose just discussed,
whenever what has transpired in the proceeding is so
offensive to the trial court's sense of justice that he
_believes the desired objective of affording the parties
a fair trial has failed, he has both the prerogative
and the duty to grant a new trial.
"
If the trial Court abuses its discretion then thanks to
our system the review court can correct the abuse.

Plaintiff cites in support of his request for a new
trial, the Court ruling in Holmes v. Nelson, Ut. 326, Pac.
2d 722. In that case an action for injuries sustained by
a three and one-half year old child who ran into the street
and was struck by defendant's automobile at about 8 :20
P.M. in mid-July, was heard by the jury, who returned a
verdict of NO cause of action. In that ca<:e it will be noted there was a question of the extent of negligence of defendant, possibility of contributory negligence and unavoidable accident, none of which exist in the present case.
In view of the conflicting testimony in that case, notwithstanding the fact that there was believeable evidence
to sustain the jury's findings of no cause of action, and
even the further question of unavoidable accident the
Court granted a new trial because the Court said there
was ample evidence to support a verdict for the child and
therefore it was proper to grant the child a new trial on
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to justify averdict of No cause of action.
If the evidence was insufficient to justify no cause of
action in that c2se, then the error in the present ca'.-'e in
failing to grant a new trial becomes more apparent b~,
cause in the insbrnt case there wa..; the finding of negligence, the ab-enc~ of contrihutor,1.T ne:.digence, the ab. ence
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of unavoidability, the absence of contradiction as to clam-

ages.
The law with regard to granting a new trial
\\'here verdict has been rendered on insufficient evidence is well stated in 58 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 140, pg. 347,
111 the following language:
"Sec. 140: If a verdict agamst a party has been rendered on insufficient evidence, his remedy is by way
of an application for a new trial. Indeed, a motion
for a new trial is indispensable where a case has been
tried to a jury and the unsuccessful party desires to
test the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict.
Where the evidence offered for the party for
whom a verdict has been rendered, conceding to it·.
the greatest probative force to which according to
the laws of evidence, it is fairly entitled, is insufficient to support or to justify the verdict, it is
the duty of the Court to set it aside and grant a new
trial. A new trial will be granted where the verdict
is wholly unsupported_by the evidence in an essential
particular, or where both -parties have, without fault,
failed to introduce material evidence."

•

This Court has said in ruling upon""'i>imilar matters
that when it comes to applying the law t;---)lundisputed
facts, the Appellate Judges are not to be classed as unreasonable simply because they don't agree with the Trial
.Judge.
A very similar case was heard by the Supreme tourt
in the case of EFCO Distributing Inc. vs Ferrin, 17 Utah
2 375, 412, p 2, 615, although in that case plaintiff failed
to produce evidence of damage and the claim of any lorn
was unsupported It is a strong holding for the case here.
The case was an action for damage for breach
7'. of contract by defendant in failing to order out fro d t..{ c:.. T-S
fifCuurt said.
"If it clearly appears that there has been mIScarriage
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of justice bec:a use jury ha ..; refused to accept Ci' edible
uncontradicted evidence, where there i;:; no rational
basis for rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that jurv
has acted under misconception of proven facts, or ha·s
misapplied or disregarded law, or where it appears
that verdict was re.,,ult of passion or prejudice, it i.s
both the prerogative and duty of Court to set aside
verdict and grant a new trial. This doe;; not have the
effect of depriving a party of a fair trial by jury, but
in reality is a safeguard to assure it."

CONCLUSION
In the extens1ve research made it is difficult to find
a parallel to the instant case. where the Court has found
negli~ence as a matter of law, and where contributory
negligence and/or an intervening cause have been ruled
out. And especially where all the evidence supported the
plaintiff's claim of injury caused by the defendant and
no evidence was presented by the defendant denying the
liability or denying the loss of wages, the expenses incurred for doctor and hospital charges following the injury and accident.

The only testimony produced by defendant was her
.
. d ,.. J V: I "1 L, Pl .
own ,where she admitted to neghgence/ mtoj arntiff's · vehicle and claimed no excuse. And the testimony of a medical Doctor called by the insurance
company to make an evaluation about two years
after the accident, whose testimony at best could only
tend to minimize the damages caused by the injuries in
the accident of December 5, 1967. He didn't claim that
the plaintiff's dcrtors and physical therapists had not performed their S8rvices as testified to, nor th::tt such service'
were not p.!·nper under their diagnosis. He, in fact corroborated the histcn' of p8.in n~d suffering since the accident.
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The only othe1· delendant witness was the inimrance
adjuster uc,rn l''<ationwiue ln.,;urance Co., who gave testimony that rn a .,,ubsequent act:ident of July 19tftf he hau
attempted to uegotiate a settlement with pldintiff and
her attorney for a sum whicn was quoted by the attorney
for negotiation but for which sett1ement was deferred. The
only rational meaning the Court could give to such testimony was an acknowledgement of damages and liability
which the second ccmpany should help pay.
The in.o tructions of the Court were faulty after he
found negligence as a matter of law that he didn't find
the negligence proximately cam.ed or contributed to the
injuries and that he didn't find liability as a matter of
law rather than to leave the jury with insufficient instructions, or guidelines.
When the trial judge subsequently found the jury as
a result of error or prejudice had mis-applied the law to
the fact'3 and had made a verdict contrary to all the credible evidence and contrary to both the law and the facts,
then that 11; was abuse of discretion for the trial court
to not have corrected the matter by granting a new trial
i:i.e1; h
li!8rl'sskei tho
tt
ts granting
trjA.l..
either on the issue of damage or a new trial on all the
issues, and it is respectfully submitted that to correct
the injustice thus caused that the Appellate Court should
remand the matter for rehearing of the issues involved
or direct a judgment.
I

Respectfully submitted,
ELDON A. ELIASON
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant
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